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Terrorists, Radicals, and Activists
Distinguishing between Countering Violent
Extremism and Preventing Extremist Violence,
and Why It Matters1
christian leuprecht, david b. skillicorn,
and cl ark m c cauley

Who is likely to sympathize with, provide material support for, or actually
engage in violent extremism, and why? These have become some of the more
pressing security questions of our time. Pragmatically, the questions are
made difficult by the small numbers who move to violence, contrasted with
the much larger numbers of people in apparently comparable circumstances
who exhibit a staunch resilience against even radicalization. Simplistic, reductionist, monocausal explanations abound: ideology or religion, relative
deprivation, political or social alienation, discrimination, or moral outrage.
However, none of these explanations can withstand rigorous empirical
scrutiny. Few Muslims actually engage in political violence – and many of
those who claim to do so are mere nominal believers or converts; poverty
abounds, but political violence does not; feelings of alienation, discrimination, or grievance are common, but political violence is rare.
In most democracies, more people get hit by lightning than die of terrorism, and many more people die in car accidents than in terrorist incidents.
Yet, security improvements in cars are incremental while the state is expected
not just to mitigate but eliminate the risk of terrorism. This is a classic example of “risk society,” where the expectation of the state’s ability to manage
risk exceeds its capacity to do so. As a result, security, intelligence, and law
enforcement agencies in democracies find themselves on a narrow path: if
they are perceived as being too aggressive, they are accused of trampling civil
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liberties; if a terrorist attack happens, the same critics quickly accuse them
of complacency and ask why more was not done to prevent the carnage.
Part of the problem is an inchoate understanding of security in a democracy. Just about everyone has been to school or to a physician, so people have
at least a simple experiential understanding of education and health care.
Beyond the occasional speeding ticket or passport application, however, the
vast majority of citizens have not had much interaction with security agencies. Instead, their perception is skewed by the “Hollywood effect”: crime
shows feature police, security agencies, spies, and terrorists who grace “personal opinion with dramatic illustration and thereby giving that opinion
apparent authority” – and the criminals are caught.2 Much of the population
has a hard time realizing that these shows are fiction, not reality. We invite
you to take a simple test: watch any crime show and start counting the legal
and constitutional violations. If you know what to look for, you will count
up dozens in a matter of minutes.
Security forces are also constrained by resources. It takes tens of people to
monitor an individual continuously; so, even the largest law enforcement
agencies in the world can only monitor a few dozen people at a time. But
there are thousands about which security intelligence and law enforcement
are concerned: reportedly some 20,500 on France’s terrorism watchlist, the
Fichiers de signalements pour la prévention et la radicalisation à caractère terroriste (fsprt) – twice as many now as in the aftermath of the Paris attacks
of 2015 – of whom as many as half are cause for serious concern.3 The difficulty for security forces is finding the needle in the haystack: the one among
thousands who will act. How, then, are security officials to optimize the allocation of resources in fighting both extremist ideas and extremist violence?
Real or perceived terrorist attacks at home or abroad foster a public perception that the issue of radicalization is far more pervasive and threatening
than it actually is. Political leaders and the media cycle seize on the more sensational cases, which by their nature have gone too far for intervention but
provide an opportunity for a sound bite or media clip. In Western democracies violent extremism remains rare and should not be confounded with
larger-scale radicalization of opinion. Unlike intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear weapons, and cyberattacks, radicalization to violence is not a
major, let alone existential, threat in democratic countries and, statistically
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at least, ranks well below many more pressing issues for local authorities and
community leaders.
In the democratic West, recent Jihadist (al-Qaeda and the more apocalyptic and caliphate-driven Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, or isis) terrorism
has largely been carried out by second- and third-generation citizens or
permanent legal residents of immigrant origin who appear to become radicalized and form operational groups in a largely bottom-up fashion. Such
homegrown (often “lone wolf ”) terrorism poses a more difficult security
challenge than “conventional” Islamist terrorism. Since there is little that distinguishes homegrown terrorists from their surrounding community until
an attack is imminent, the time between group coalescence and attacks has
often been short, and lone wolves can act without any group interaction.
Many drivers for such bottom-up radicalization have been posited:4 a sense
of alienation in a non-Islamic society, grievance about Western foreign policies, economic marginalization, superficial knowledge of Islam, and even a
desire for status and excitement in otherwise boring lives. Some common
patterns have also been noted,5 such as the presence of a local, charismatic
figure who acts as a mentor and travel to a region where Muslims are perceived to be threatened and victimized. Models based on these drivers have
been used tactically by law enforcement and counterterrorism agencies to
focus resources on the groups and individuals that present the greatest risk
and by governments, in more abstract ways, in an effort to reduce the drivers
that create radicalized individuals in the first place.
The objective of this chapter is to clarify common misperceptions about
terrorism and how to prevent it. Since 9/11, governments have become especially concerned about “radicalization”; so, the first section will demystify
the common adulteration of this concept. The second section frames common research questions and problems. Short of understanding why people
feel the way they do, the third section prods the reader to ask (1) whether
there is a structure to the attitudes that “radicals” hold, (2) what is the relationship that emerges from that structure, and (3) what are its broader policy
implications. To promote a better grasp of how to parse policy approaches
to this subject, subsequent sections take up the problem of countering the
narrative of global jihad by positing a pyramid model that distinguishes between action and opinion, and the implications that follow.
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Operationalizing the Concept of “Radicalization”
With experience and research showing that radicalization of opinion seldom leads to violence and that there is no single path for radicalization to
violence, framing the problem is a fundamental challenge. In the vernacular, the concept of “radicalization” has been reduced to a pejorative catchall
that is equated with terrorism: all radicals are terrorists, and all terrorists
are radicalized. This adulteration of the concept is empirically false: in fact,
all terrorist are radical, but most radicals are not terrorists. Conceptual clarity matters.
Radicalization is generally understood as a change in beliefs, feelings, and
actions towards increased support for one side of an intergroup conflict. By
this definition, for instance, women who pushed for the extension of the
franchise were radicalized, so was the government of the United States after
9/11. Radicalization per se, then, is not necessarily problematic. Instead, this
chapter is concerned with a particular kind of radicalization in which individuals sympathize with, justify, or participate in politically motivated
violence against a state or its citizens.
Activism – legal and nonviolent political action – differs from radicalism
– illegal political action.6 Only some radical activity is violent and, of that,
terrorism is the extreme radical activity that targets civilians. The relation
between activism and radicalism is an issue of considerable practical importance for security forces. Some observers have gone so far as to suggest a
“conveyor belt” from Muslim activism to jihadi radicalism, a metaphor suggesting that extreme opinions bring individuals to activism, and frustrated
activism then leads inexorably to radicalism. This chapter rejects the conveyor belt metaphor and distinguishes among three levels of radicalization
of individuals based on actions:
They engage in politically motivated violence (“terrorists”);
They engage in nonviolent but illegal political actions such as financial support for terrorists (“radicals”); or
They engage in legal political actions such as protest meetings (“activists”).
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The boundaries between these categories of action are objective, since a
given individual has or has not protested, engaged in illegal acts, or engaged
in violence. The nuance is important because the number of terrorists, by
this definition, is bound to be minuscule.
On the surface, these three gradations of what are commonly lumped
together as radicals cannot readily be distinguished from the much larger
pool or community of those from whom the radicals are drawn but who
have not become radicalized to any kind of action. Radicalization, then, is
the process by which an individual, who is initially inert, ends up in one of
these three categories of political action.
A fourth category of radicalization consists of individuals who sympathize with radicals but who do not engage in any kind of political action.
Such individuals confuse the narrative because their views may seem more
extreme than any of the other categories – but these views are totally without
political sequelae.7 They have been called “armchair jihadists.”
Having spent decades studying the relation between beliefs and feelings
(attitudes) and actions (behaviour), social psychologists have consistently
shown that most behaviour is not well explained by attitudes. Under some
circumstances, beliefs and feelings are good predictors of action (in a voting
booth, for instance). In most circumstances, however, beliefs and feelings
are weak predictors of action (when strong social norms run counter to an
individual’s attitude, for instance). In short, radical opinions are cheap, but
radicalized action is expensive. Radicals and terrorists expose themselves to
possible incarceration and even death.
There is no simple generalization to be made about the commitment to
extremist violence: belief in and of itself is an unreliable predictor of an
individual’s predisposition towards committing acts of terrorism.8 The
number of people in each of the three categories of political action may be
a function of the escalating costs associated with radical activity. Costs may
explain why the number of terrorists is smaller than the number of radicals,
which is smaller than the number of activists, and all combined are a small
subset of the larger community of sympathizers from which they are drawn.9
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The Research Agenda
These observations suggest a number of research questions about radicalization:
How do individuals end up in one of the three radical action categories?
Are there three different kinds of people who end up in these three
different categories?
What are the drivers of the transitions involved? What motivates
an individual to cross boundaries, either passing from nonradical to
radical or from radical to terrorist?
What are the barriers to these transitions? Why do so few people
become radicalized and is there anything special about these few?
Do the categories of action and the transitions between different
categories depend on the particular cause being espoused or do all
movements and issues exhibit commonalities in the structure of radicalization?
These questions are of theoretical and empirical interest (insofar as they
can be subjected to scrutiny). As strategy turns from prosecution to interdiction and prevention,10 intelligence, counterterrorism, and law enforcement organizations are also wondering:
Is it possible to tell which category of action an individual will move
toward by examining an individual’s attitudes?
More generally, can current attitudes predict the future political trajectory of an individual?
For these timely and relevant questions, the evidence base is surprisingly
scant because individuals who meet the scope conditions are extraordinarily
difficult to study. Attempts to answer these questions have suffered from a
number of weaknesses. One popular approach has been to interview radicals
who have been found guilty of political violence or associated activity.11 This
approach raises a litany of methodological problems, not the least of which
is that it samples on the dependent variable by examining in detail the beliefs, attitudes, and life histories of those who have become radical without
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controlling for beliefs, attitudes, and life histories of the much larger pool of
similar individuals who remain inert.12
Second, this approach is marred by selection bias and a small n. The pool
of radicals, especially those willing to be interviewed by researchers, is small;
consequently, the evidence gleaned is inevitably anecdotal.13 Hence the answers arrived at do not offer particularly compelling explanations of how
radicals differ from nonradicals, especially for studies that rely heavily on
the subject’s ex post facto reconstruction of events. Human memory can be
all too creative, biased, and unreliable. A relatively small n may facilitate the
generation of hypotheses but not their testing.14 In theory, the solution to
this quandary would be large-n longitudinal analysis among at-risk communities, but longitudinal community surveys large enough to yield robust
results would be prohibitively expensive.
Third, humans and human communities are complex. This makes it unlikely that radicalization is a single process.15 A quantitative approach is
better suited to multivariate research than the qualitative research that has
been the hallmark of much of the literature thus far. Independent effects,
feedback loops, and causal mechanism are hard to disentangle using a qualitative approach, especially when they are posited to include a complex
interaction of structural and personal factors such as political background
(for example, group relative deprivation), psychological makeup and personality characteristics (for example, trauma and psychopathology), and
social circumstances of joining the jihad (for example, identity conflicts).16
These make it difficult to infer pathways, drivers, or barriers from qualitative
work whose samples are small in size, selection-biased, and plagued by omitted variables.17

Models of Radicalization
Theories of radicalization describe a process that takes place over time.
Ergo, they necessarily imply certain expectations about attitudinal or behavioural patterns at various temporal stages.18 The connection between
radical beliefs and attitudes, and radicalization to violent or illegal action,
has been broadly understood in three ways. First, attitudes towards a con-
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flict may vary within a population but the relationship to violence is weak
or indeterminate. Second, such attitudes may vary across a population, but
violence is conditioned by perceptions of the cost of criminal action. Third,
such attitudes may vary within a population, and the variation is correlated
with likelihood of radical action.
In the first model, conflict attitudes may vary within a population, but
such variation is regarded as operationally useless – what matters is detecting
when an individual crosses the line from radical views of any kind or intensity to planning and carrying out violent or illegal actions – a legalist view of
radicalization. This viewpoint naturally leads to an emphasis on intelligence
and law enforcement as a way to construct “tripwires” to detect when individuals move from ideas to action – for example, watching travel patterns,
changes in behaviour, and so on. This approach allegedly characterizes the
New York Police Department’s (nypd) Demographic Unit.19 This model of
radicalization makes no particular predictions about attitudes of radicals in
contrast to the community from which they come, so research cannot easily
validate or falsify it.
In the second model, conflict attitudes may vary across a population, but
the difference between those who move to violence and those who do not
is their individual perceptions of the strength of the inhibitors to violence,
both external and personality-based – a psychological and economic view
of radicalization.20 This viewpoint naturally leads to an emphasis on (a)
understanding the incentive structure in the population and community,
and (b) creating disincentives whenever possible to discourage the transition to violence. This model of radicalization predicts that attitudes to
economic or psychological issues should show some variation between radicals and those who are not – perhaps related to differences in risk aversion,
for example. This model also predicts that the distribution of individuals
should show a pyramidal structure where, as opinions become more radical,
the number of individuals who hold them decreases.
In the third model, conflict attitudes vary within a population, and these
attitudes affect individuals’ likelihood of engaging in radical action. This
viewpoint naturally leads to a scan for, as it were, dangerous ideas, those
attitudes that create a proclivity for violence.21 Some attitudes, beliefs, and
feelings may be affected by changing external realities, so this approach is
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particularly fruitful in uncovering points of leverage accessible to governments and societies. Strategies for deradicalization only make sense from
this point of view.22
This model of radicalization predicts that attitudes should cluster – that
there should be measurable differences in attitudes between those who are
radical and those who are not. Either the particular issues for which these
differences occur are drivers of radicalization or they are consequences (sequelae) of radicalization, and – a key issue – it may be possible to infer which
is which. According to this model, the distribution of individuals by conflict
opinions is again anticipated to have a pyramidal structure but perhaps with
an even more obvious “gap” between commonly held opinions and those associated with radicalization.23
A more diffuse model of radicalization that is implicit in many government programs posits intensity or dissatisfaction as inherently dangerous,
to some extent regardless of the content of the dissatisfaction. Those who
are political or religious activists are regarded with suspicion because of a
belief that passion is a kind of slippery slope that leads from legitimate protest, to illegal activity, and finally to violence – a variant of the conveyor belt
model. This model predicts that radicalization should be associated with
political, social, religious, or moral intensity or dissatisfaction. A roughly
pyramidal distribution of individuals by conflict attitudes is again expected
in this model, as relatively few individuals can maintain a high level of passion about political issues. They might be associated with political, social,
religious, or moral intensity or dissatisfaction.
Notice that all of these models begin from recognition that conflictrelated attitudes vary within a population. This is indeed the pattern found
in polls relating to jihadist, right-wing, and left-wing grievances. For instance, about half of US Muslims believe that the war on terrorism is a war
on Islam, and half do not.24 The different models represent our current
uncertainties about the relation between population attitudes and the likelihood of political violence by members of that population.
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Policy Issues
A good deal of government policy makes implicit assumptions about
causality: Muslims become radicals because they are unhappy. The rational
policy maker’s utilitarian instincts presume that happier Muslims mean
fewer radicals. Thus, the solution is a programmatic policy response focused
on spending money in areas of social support, education, housing, and so
on. Some research on individual attitudes, actions, and aggregate patterns
of terrorism suggests that weak welfare policies may foment religious extremism, while other research suggests that robust social welfare policies
reduce incidents of terrorism.25 A social welfare approach is also conveniently appealing to the egalitarian instincts of the electorate; it is in line
with the welfare-state premise of nation-building using T.H. Marshall’s
social conception of citizenship, and it shows the government to be “doing
something” about the problem.
Yet ties between economic status and extremism turn out to be weak at
both the individual and aggregate levels.26 This was also the view that informed the White House’s 2002 National Security Strategy which goes out
of its way to stress that the 9/11 attacks were perpetrated by middle-class,
educated misanthropes led by a rich religious fanatic.27
Findings of a poll of Ottawa Muslims we conducted can inform this debate.28 Radical attitudes appear absent among Muslims with moral and/or
social/political satisfaction. Moral dissatisfaction does appear to be associated with increased social dissatisfaction, and, for some, the combination
is associated with some activities and attitudes that correspond to radicalization. On the one hand, these results do not support the assumption that
improving individuals’ life satisfaction will decrease the prevalence of radical attitudes, let alone reduce the prevalence of radical action. The results
suggest instead that government policy would have to increase moral/religious satisfaction rather than social/political satisfaction. Moral/religious
satisfaction, though, appears to be largely beyond the reach of government
policy. In short, as appealing as social welfare programs may be to politicians, policy makers, and electorates, the strategic payoffs against radicalization are not evident.
On the other hand, there appears to be little indication that governments
should take the blame for the alleged inflammatory effects of their policies
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and actions. The same poll of Ottawa Muslims found that approval of
Western governments (including Canada, US, and Israel) was unrelated to
approval of jihadist groups (including al-Qaeda and Hamas).29 The implication of this surprising result is that policies that help Muslims like Western
governments more may do nothing to help Muslims like jihadists less.

The Metanarrative of Global Jihad
In his celebrated 1993 paper, Samuel Huntington suggested that the world’s
future conflicts were likely to occur around cultural fault lines in a “Clash
of Civilizations.”30 In particular, Huntington predicted a growing conflict
between Western and Islamic cultures that seemed to be confirmed by alQaeda’s 9/11 attacks on the US. Whatever the virtues or failings of the “Clash
of Civilizations” thesis, it has at least moved attention beyond the perpetrators of violence to concerns about the broader base of sympathizers and
supporters of violence.
Thus the “war on terrorism” declared by President George W. Bush included a “war of ideas” aimed at reaching out to a billion Muslims, worldwide, to discourage the kind of radical Islam that brings support and
recruits to militant Muslim groups. Empirically, the war of ideas has led to
a growing literature of polling studies designed to assess both Western and
Muslim views of jihadist militants who challenge the West. In Muslimmajority countries, the war of ideas aims to lower the appeal of armed nonstate actors such as isis and al-Qaeda, and to raise approval of the US and
other Western countries targeted by jihadists. Waging the war of ideas requires getting specific about the mobilization frame that supports and justifies jihadist violence.
The metanarrative of global jihad has four basic components: (1) Islam is
under attack by Western crusaders led by the United States; (2) jihadis,
whom the West refers to as “terrorists,” are defending against this attack; (3)
the actions they take in defence of Islam are proportional, just, and religiously sanctified; and, therefore (4) it is the duty of good Muslims to
support these actions.31 This metanarrative can be broken down further into
four kinds of discourse. The political narrative is concerned with the evils of
the West, including a neo-Marxist take on global inequities and distributive
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effects arising from Western hegemony and exploitation whose roots can be
traced to Islam’s best-known cultural historian, Ibn Khaldun (1332–1406).
The moral narrative focuses on the internal contradictions of liberal democracies, which profess freedom as their core value and equality and justice as
their subsidiary values but where these ideals remain largely unrealized, and
the associated hypocrisy drives Western moral decay. The religious narrative
legitimises violent struggle to defend Islam against the crusader West and,
in the case of isis, a claim to be the “true” heart of Islam and so at odds even
with the rest of Islam, including al-Qaeda. The social-psychological narrative,
finally, employs a solipsistic in-group–out-group strategy to brand as infidels
those who do not subscribe to the jihadist narrative, while promoting the
brotherhood of arms as a means of fulfilling a yearning for adventure and
sacrifice that compels the “true believer.”
McCauley and Moskalenko propose that the global jihad narrative is best
analysed in terms of a pyramid of radicalization32 whose base is composed
of Muslims who currently do not accept any of the flobal jihad narrative (figure 1.1). A layer above the base are those who sympathise with the first step
of the jihadist frame: that the West is waging a war on Islam (global jihad
level 1, pyramid second level). Next higher in the pyramid are Muslims who
believe that jihadis are acting in defense of Islam and that their actions are
morally and religiously justified (global jihad levels 2 and 3, pyramid third
level). Highest in the pyramid are Muslims who believe there is an individual
duty to join in violence and participate in the defence of Islam (global jihad
level 4, pyramid fourth level).
There is some complexity here: Islam distinguishes between defence that
must be mandated by legitimate authority, a group responsibility, and defence that is an individual obligation of every good Muslim. The battle cry
of jihadis is that the current threat to Islam justifies an individual obligation
not dependent on having state or religious authority behind it. We here identify belief in the individual obligation as the highest, most radicalized level
of the narrative pyramid. The implication of a pyramid model of the global
jihad narrative is that the lower levels represent more people, with lower levels of radicalization.
The pyramid model of radicalization implies that different pieces of the
global jihad narrative are held by Muslims in different layers of the pyramid. Not all who justify suicide bombing also see a war on Islam, but most
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Figure 1.1 The action pyramid

do. Similarly, not all who feel a personal moral obligation for jihad also
defend suicide bombing, but many do. In short, those who accept more
radical elements of the global jihad narrative are more likely – but not 100
percent likely – to accept less radical elements. Given that different subsets
of Muslims accept different elements of the global jihad narrative, it seems
likely that the origins or sources or predictors of acceptance differ for different elements. Polling data give us an idea of who is likely to be more (or
less) prone to the narrative, but not knowing why the narrative has traction
with any given individual makes it difficult to devise an effective counternarrative strategy.33

A Two-Pyramids Model of Radicalization
For decades psychologists have studied the relation between beliefs and feelings (cognition and attitude) and action (behaviour). When action consistent with beliefs and feelings is costly (such as committing oneself to a
suicide bombing), the gap between belief and behaviour is likely to be large.
This seems to be the situation for the global jihad narrative: the opportunity cost of believing in a war on Islam and feeling that suicide attacks are
justified in defence of Islam is relatively low; action in defence of Islam is dis-
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Figure 1.2 The opinion pyramid

proportionately costly in time, energy, and, at least in Western countries, risk
of incarceration or death. Almost half of US Muslims believe there is a war
on Islam, while 10 percent justify suicide bombing in defense of Islam. Even
that 10 percent corresponds to about 100,000 adult US Muslims, but only
hundreds of US Muslims have been indicted or convicted of terrorist actions. As already noted, opinion is cheap, but action is costly.
The gap between the global jihad narrative and global jihad violence, at
least in Western countries, indicates the need for another pyramid model, a
pyramid of action (figure 1.2). Here the base includes all Muslims who are
politically inert, whatever their beliefs or feelings. The next higher level are
activists, engaged in legal and nonviolent political action, although some
may join in one or another part of the global jihad narrative. Hizb ut-Tahrir
members, for instance, are legal activists in both the United Kingdom (UK)
and in the US (Hizb had its first national meeting in the US in Chicago in
July 2009), even though Hizb, like isis and al-Qaeda, is striving to reestablish
a supranational caliphate. Higher yet are radicals, engaged in illegal political
action that may include violence. Finally, at the apex of the action pyramid
are the terrorists, radicals who target civilians with lethal violence.
It is important to distinguish between nonviolent and violent political behaviour because, ultimately, the latter is of primary concern for the purposes
of public security. The former is of interest only if there is evidence that it
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foreshadows the latter. For example, the movement for voting rights for
women and the civil-rights movement militating for racial equality were
both considered radical and engaged in some illegal political action. With
the benefit of hindsight, however, would we judge them as a liability or as an
asset to the body politic?
The borders between the levels of the action pyramid represent the most
important transition points of radicalization in action: from doing nothing
to doing something, from legal political action to illegal political action, and
from illegal political action to killing civilians. However, the action pyramid
is neither a conveyor belt nor a stage theory in which an individual must
progress through each succeeding level in a linear fashion to become a terrorist. It is not necessary to be an activist in order to become a radical nor is
it necessary to be radical in order to become a terrorist.
A particular challenge for understanding radicalization in the action pyramid are cases of lone wolf or lone actor terrorists. These are individuals who
act without group or organizational support; they plan and carry out an attack on their own. In effect, these are individuals who move in an apparently
single step (and often quickly) from politically inert (base of the action pyramid) to terrorist action (apex of the pyramid). How is this possible? How
could Major Nidal Hasan move from US Army officer to killing thirteen and
wounding more than thirty in a mass shooting at Ft Hood, Texas?
The next section reviews mechanisms of radicalization seen in cases
where individuals join a terrorist group, but these mechanisms do not seem
adequate to explain how so few individuals move to attacking alone. McCauley and Moskalenko have suggested two possible profiles of these unusual individuals.34 Disconnected-disordered individuals are loners, often
with some history of mental disorder; they have little to lose in trying to
escape their painful lives to become terrorist heroes. The only support they
need is the perception that many will see them as martyrs. By contrast, caring-compelled individuals have normal social connections, including work
and family. They have no history of mental disorder. They seem to be moved
to action by unusual sensitivity to the sufferings of others – an unusual capacity for sympathy and empathy that pushes them to do something to fight
back against perceived injustice. Momin Khawaja is such a person: he is incarcerated in Canada in connection with a bomb plot, but his initial act of
radicalization was his solo attempt to join the Taliban to fight US forces in
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Afghanistan.35 The two profiles may not be mutually exclusive. Major Hasan
seems to have been caring-compelled as well as socially disconnected (but
not disordered).
Lone actor terrorists are rare. Research on more cases is necessary to test
the usefulness of the two possible profiles, but it is already worth noticing
that both profiles point to the power of emotional experience in moving individuals to terrorism. Emotional experience may also be important in the
radicalization of the much larger number of terrorists who act as part of a
group or organization.

Mechanisms of Radicalization
Any attempt at formulating a stage theory of radicalization in action is contradicted by the multiple mechanisms of radicalization identified at individual, group, and mass levels. McCauley and Moskalenko have compiled
a suggestive list of mechanisms of radicalization, mostly from case materials
about terrorist groups and terrorist individuals.36

Individual Level
1. Personal grievance. An individual is angry and seeks revenge for government action seen as harming self or loved ones. Personal grievance usually
does not lead to action unless interpreted as part of some larger group
grievance. Chechen Black Widows revenging brothers and husbands killed
by Russians are a commonly cited example.
2. Group grievance. Identification with a group perceived as victims can radicalize an individual who has not personally experienced any harm or hurt.
This includes “lone wolf terrorism” and “sudden jihad syndrome,” with such
examples as the Unabomber, Ted Kaczynski, as well as Mohammed Rea
Taheri-azar and Momin Khawaja.
3. Self-persuasion in action – the slippery slope. This mechanism is rooted
in the famous Milgram experiment and is consistent with the image of a
“conveyor belt” where people are gradually radicalized in a step-by-step
process.
4. Regard. Individuals can join a militant group because someone they
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regard or love – friend, romantic partner, family member – asks them or
because they want to aid and protect a loved one. Sometimes a member of
a radical group may cultivate a personal connection with a potential recruit.
5. Fear, escape. In a failed state, individuals can join a militant group because
they feel safer with friends with guns than on the street alone. Examples are
found among militants of the Revolutionary Armed Forces in Colombia
(farc), sectarian groups such as Daesh in Iraq, and some ultra-nationalists
on the right fringe of the political spectrum. Some join a militant group to
escape loneliness, personal shame, or trouble with the police.
6. Thrill, Status, Money. This mechanism depends on individual preferences,
usually those of young males. Examples include joining the US Marine
Corps, setting Improvised Explosive Devices (ied) in Iraq or Afghanistan
for money, or joining a street gang.

Small Group Level
7. Group polarization. Discussion among members of a like-minded group
moves members further in the initially agreed upon direction. Two tendencies contribute: not wanting to fall behind in representing group-favoured
values and hearing a preponderance of arguments in the group-favoured
direction.
8. Group competition. Radicalization can occur when nonstate actors compete with a state, compete against nonstate groups (often in the form of
“outbidding” other groups), and when factions of the same group compete
with one another (such as multiple fissions within the Irish Republican
Army).
9. Extreme cohesion under isolation/threat. This multiplier of group dynamics (mechanisms 7 and 8) occurs for underground groups, cults, and small
groups in combat.

Mass Level
Mass level mechanisms are mechanisms of opinion radicalization.
10. External threat. This mechanism is at work at both the group level (mechanism 8) and the mass level. External threats lead to increased group
identification, magnified ethnic entrepreneurship and the power of leaders,
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sanctions for in-group deviates, and idealized in-group values. An example
is the US reaction to 9/11 and the Somali diaspora’s reaction to Ethiopian
(Christian) troops entering Somalia in 2006.
11. Hate. An essentialized and dehumanized view of the enemy facilitates
killing by ethnic or religious category, including civilians as well as militants
and military.
12. Martyrdom. Martyrs can radicalize a mass audience by their example
of sacrifice. A classic example is the 1981 hunger strike in which ten Irish Republican Army (ira)/Irish National Liberation Army (inla) prisoners perished, but the Republican cause was resuscitated.
Five of the six individual-level mechanisms – personal grievance, slippery
slope, regard, fear, and thrill-seeking – do not depend on accepting new
ideas from a radical ideology or narrative and can move individuals to radical action, including joining an existing militant group. In particular, these
five mechanisms do not depend on the existence or acceptance of the narrative of global jihad.
In many cases, a radical narrative or ideology is learned after an individual
joins a radical group. In these cases, the narrative is less a cause than a rationalization of commitment to radical action. In rational-choice terms, we
might say that the purpose of the narrative is to reduce transaction costs of
group interaction by building and reinforcing group cohesion and group
consensus about action. Narratives may thus be better understood as enablers rather than as drivers of radicalization. To the extent that narratives
are developed out of action and small group commitments, the potential for
blocking radicalization by counternarratives is limited.

Relating the Two Pyramids
It should be clear from the preceding discussion that relating the two pyramids, the narrative pyramid and the action pyramid, is anything but straightforward. Figure 1.3 represents, for each action level, a possible distribution
of acceptance of the four aspects of the global jihad narrative.
In this representation, acceptance of narrative elements is correlated with
levels of action, such that accepting a personal moral obligation for jihad –
relative thickness of the black band within each action level – is most likely
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Figure 1.3 Possible distribution of acceptance

among the terrorists and least likely among the inert. Similarly, belief in none
of the aspects of the global jihad narrative – relative thickness of the white
band within each action level – is most likely among the inert and least likely
among the terrorists.
But the correlation is only probabilistic, not deterministic. Some jihadists
may accept no part of the global jihad narrative – for instance, individuals
who joined a terrorist group for the thrill of guns and fighting. And there
may be a few politically inert individuals who construct a personal moral
obligation for jihad – for instance, individuals who want to hurt their parents
by leaving for jihad.
As already described, it is neither obvious nor known what parts of the
global jihad narrative appear with what frequency in different levels of the
action pyramid. Mechanisms of radicalization that do not depend on ideology or narrative imply that the global jihad narrative is not necessary for
radicalization in action. It seems likely that participation in a radical jihadist
group soon teaches most or all of the global jihad narrative, but the narrative
is not necessary to initiate radical action.
A better understanding of how individuals and groups shift between sympathy, justification, and support for illegal political activity37 and the way this
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shift relates to the “multiple economic, social, political, and organizational
relations that span borders”38 is needed. Are there tipping points that put individuals “over the edge” into action? Does a critical mass of drivers need to
be accumulated for individuals to cross thresholds? Are there quantum leaps
from illegal political action such as banned marches and property damage
to lethal violence against human targets? What precipitates such leaps?

Efficacy and Efficiency Issues
The weak relation between narrative and action limits the efficacy of intelligence and law enforcement in countering radicalization. The mandate of
security and intelligence agencies is not to control opinion radicalization
but to protect against violent threats. A common presumption is that radical
ideas translate into a violent threat. And not just any type of violence but
terrorism: politically motivated violence that is directed at general populations, not so much for the purpose of maximizing casualties as for the
purpose of maximising psychological impact to disrupt legitimate authority
and the capacity to govern. Bravado about violence proliferates among radicals, but they are unlikely to act on it – those most likely to act tend not to
engage in bravado.39 On the contrary, those prone to violence are fully aware
of the costs associated with their activity and, as rational actors, will not
draw attention to themselves. In other words, zeroing in on “narrative radicals” is likely to generate an ineffective diversion of resources from “action
radicals,” as false positives proliferate. Together, the three pyramids indicate
that the relationship between radical ideas and radical violence is variable
and uncertain.
Instead of conceiving the process of radicalization as a pathway,40 with a
mechanistic understanding of individuals on a quasi-determinist trajectory,
the evidence points, instead, to plural pathways with no profile trajectory.
Models that treat radicalization as a single pathway that starts at political
sympathy and ends in political violence, grossly oversimplify a heterogeneous process by making many of the variables that matter exogenous to
the model.41 Some “self-radicalize,”42 others are specifically targeted by recruiters,43 others recruited by family or friendship groups,44 yet others who
are radicalized through media, especially the Internet.45
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Human Rights Issues
Democracies have an unfortunate history of labelling any serious challenge
to the status quo as radicalism. While the history of the rise of the modern
security and police state throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
need not detain us here,46 states cannot be careful enough when endeavouring to control or censor thought and beliefs. Indeed, the rise of democratic
pluralism can be read as the struggle against state control and censorship of
views from the margins. Some secularists today would like to attribute many
of the world’s ills to religion.47 Their inference is that any type of “extremist”
religion ought to be marginalized or banned. The problem with this approach is that it misses the crux of the problem: only actual violence is the
responsibility of security forces.
Democracies are premised on the assumption that freedom of speech
and thought should prevail, which is why speech is protected from arbitrary
government interference. Only under very specific circumstances is an utterance in and of itself a crime. Rather, the criminal justice system in a
democracy is generally structured to deal with acts of crime ex post facto.
Intent and motivation are not normally punishable, although they may factor into the degree of punishment. In short, gauging threat by means of
profiling characteristics such as religion, political opinion, or country of
origin is not particularly effective, unnecessarily aggravates the security
problem by alienating entire communities, and is usually difficult to reconcile with democratic constitutions. Since courts have been reticent to
convict based on terrorist motivation and intent, and since political opinion
does not necessarily translate into actual illegal action, focus on the global
jihad narrative is not a fruitful avenue for intelligence and law enforcement
to pursue. Rather the war of ideas that can be tracked in polls, focus groups,
web sites, and video releases must be separated from the war on terrorism.
The pyramid of narrative and the pyramid of action can together contribute
to this kind of understanding and this kind of action.
Another way to tackle counternarratives is to invert the problem. This
chapter suggests that one way to think about global jihad is as a massive
free-rider problem: While the grievances are widely shared, the call to arms
is not. Moreover, those who share the call to arms may have motives other
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than grievances to join the fight. For a counternarrative strategy to be effective, then, it should (1) frustrate the violent extremists by exacerbating
their free-rider problem and (2) target those individuals who sympathize
with the metanarrative without the metanarrative having affected their actual behaviour.
The evidence in this chapter suggests that the way to aggravate the freerider problem is to widen the gap between narrative and behaviour. That is
best done by (1) raising the costs associated with acting on violent beliefs
(which liberal democracies’ legislators and security forces have done quite
successfully in recent years) and (2) mitigating the mechanisms of radicalization that can push some individuals to bear such costs nonetheless.

Conclusion
The war of ideas against the global jihadist narrative must be distinguished
from the war against active terrorists. Violent political action must be the
focus of security forces, whereas the war of ideas is in the political realm of
choosing and promoting political policies.
Within the war of ideas, different parts of the global jihad narrative are
held by different audiences, and each part and its audience must be separately targeted if counternarratives are to be effective.48 One approach to
the war of ideas would give priority to top-down counternarratives that target (1) individuals who are higher up in the pyramid and (2) individuals
who are particularly prone to an upward trajectory in the pyramid. The
more radicalized individuals higher up the pyramid are, in one sense, an
easier target because there are fewer of them. This makes the counternarrative easier to tailor but also makes it more difficult to communicate the
message to the target audience. In addition, those individuals who are
already more radicalized are likely to be resistant to even the most convincing counternarrative.
The second set of individuals is even more complicated to address because, in each pyramid level – whether of the narrative pyramid or the action
pyramid – few will move toward greater radicalization in any given period
of time. And there are many mechanisms of radicalization and thus many
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combination-trajectories to radicalization. A “profile” of individuals likely
to show increased radicalization is thus unlikely to be helpful; a triangulation
of factors to gauge risk perhaps more so.
In sum, the top-down approach is not promising. Radicals and terrorists
are difficult to reach and difficult to move, and no profile exists for predicting
those most susceptible to radicalization. A lesser but still significant problem
is that focusing on the more radicalized presents a real predicament for research. The higher up in the radicalization pyramid people are – whether
narrative or action pyramid – the less likely they are to collaborate with researchers for fear of alerting security forces.
The war of ideas should thus give priority to a bottom-up focus on the
lower levels of the two pyramids. We cannot count on turning Muslims
against Islamic militants via counternarratives that help Muslims feel more
positive toward the West. Similarly, perhaps we cannot count on making
Muslims more positive toward the West by turning them against jihadist militants. Although it is easy to assume that Muslims must choose between
jihadis and the West, our results suggest that the war of ideas against the
global jihad narrative must have two separate and independent targets: moving Muslims against militants and moving Muslims toward the West.
Finally, it is important to raise another kind of difficulty with counternarratives, no matter whether the target is top-down or bottom-up. The danger
is that a message may be effective with the target audience but have unintended consequences for those not immediately targeted. In this, counternarratives are similar to more kinetic forms of counterinsurgency: both
can have collateral damage that undermines political goals. For instance, a
message arguing that Islam does not approve killing enemy civilians might
combat acceptance of suicide bombing in defence of Islam but also, at the
same time, reinforce, at least implicitly, that Western countries are enemies
engaged in war against Islam.
In the end, the danger with counternarratives is a “ready-fire-aim”
problem: We think we know the source of the problem when, in fact, the
issue is more complex and differentiated than it appears. Although a wellintentioned solution, counternarratives may either risk diffusing scarce
resources without a measurable effect or spawning unintended consequences. The good news is that, in the marketplace of ideas, democracy’s
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social contract, premised on nonviolence to settle political disputes, appears to have the upper hand. The bad news is that democracies have not
cornered the market.

n ote s
1 This chapter updates select material that had been published previously as
David B. Skillicorn, Christian Leuprecht, and Conrad Winn, “Home-Grown Islamist Radicalization in Canada: Process Insights from an Attitudinal Survey,”
Canadian Journal of Political Science 45, no. 4 (2012): 929–56; and as Christian
Leuprecht, Todd Hataley, Clark McCauley, Sophia Moskalenko, “Containing
the Narrative: Strategy and Tactics in Countering the Storyline of Global
Jihad,” Journal of Policing, Intelligence, and Counter Terrorism 5, no.1 (April–
May 2010), 42–57. Revised version reprinted as “Narratives And CounterNarratives For Global Jihad: Opinion Versus Action,” in Countering Violent
Extremist Narratives, ed. E.J.A.M. Kessels (The Hague: National Coordinator
for Counterterrorism [nctb], 2010), 58–70.
2 David Canter and Donna Young, “Beyond ‘Offender Profiling’: The Need
for an Investigative Psychology,” in Handbook of Psychology in Legal Contexts,
ed. David Carson and Ray Bull (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 2005),
171–205.
3 bfmtv, 12 December 2018, https://rmc.bfmtv.com/mediaplayer/video/
trasbourg-sebastien-pietrasanta-il-y-a-aujourd-hui-20-500-fiches-fsprt-enfrance-1124653.html.
4 Brandan O’Duffy, “Radical atmosphere: Explaining jihadist radicalization in
the UK,” PS: Politcal Science & Politics 41, no. 1 (2008): 37–42; Jamie Bartlett
et. al., The Edge of Violence: A radical approach to extremism (London: Demos,
2010), http://www.demos.co.uk/files/Edge_of_Viole nce_-_web.pdf?1271346195;
Rachel Briggs and Jonathan Birdwell, “Radicalization among Muslims in the
UK,” MICROCON Policy Working Paper 7 (2009), http://www.microconflict.
eu/publications/PWP7_ RB_JB.pdf; Thomas Hegghammer, “Terrorist Recruitment and Radicalization in Saudi Arabia,” Middle East Policy 13, no. 4 (2006):
39–60.
5 Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, Radicalization in the West: The homegrown
threat (New York: nypd, 2007); Alan Travis, “The Making of an Extremist,”

von hlatky interior.qxp_Layout 1 2019-09-24 10:21 PM Page 42

Leuprecht, Skillicorn, and McCauley

42

The Guardian, 20 August 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/aug/20/
uksecurity.terrorism.
6 Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, Friction: How Conflict Radicalizes
Them and Us (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).
7 Ibid.
8 Max Taylor, “Is Terrorism a Group Phenomenon?” Aggression and Violent
Behaviour 15, no. 2 (2010): 121–9; Max Taylor and John Horgan, “A Conceptual
Framework for Addressing Psychological Process in the Development of a
Terrorist,” Terrorism and Political Violence 18, no. 4 (2006): 585–601.
9 Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008).
10 Lorenzo Vidino, “Homegrown Jihadist Terrorism in the United States: A New
and Occasional Phenomenon?,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 32 no. 1
(2009): 1–17; Brian M. Jenkins, Would-Be Warriors: Incidents of Jihadist Radicalization in the United States Since September 11, 2001 (Santa Monica ca: rand,
OP-292-0C, 2010).
11 Eg. Lorne L. Dawson and Amarnath Amarasingam, “Talking to Foreign Fighters: Insights into the Motivations for Hijrah to Syria and Iraq,” Studies in
Conflict and Terrorism 40 no. 3 (2017): 191–210.
12 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvaia Press, 2004); Sageman, Leaderless Jihad.
13 Scott Atran, Talking to the Enemy: Faith, Brotherhood, and the (Un)making of
Terrorists (New York: Harper Collins, 2010); Peter Waldmann, Ethnischer Radikalismus: Ursachen and Folgen gewaltsamer Minderheitenkonflikte (Opladen:
Westdeutscher Verlag, 1989); J Bower Bell, The IRA 1968–2000: An Analysis
of a Secret Army (London: Frank Cass, 2000); Christine C. Fair, “Who Are Pakistan’s Militants and Their Families?” Terrorism and Political Violence 20, no. 1
(2008): 49–65; Thomas Hegghammer, “Terrorist Recruitment and Radicalization in Saudi Arabia,” Middle East Policy 13, no. 4 (2006): 39–60; John Horgan,
The Psychology of Terrorism (Abingdon UK: Routledge, 2005).
14 Arend Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and The Comparative Method,”
American Political Science Review 65, no. 3 (1971): 682–93.
15 Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism; Taylor and Horgan, “A Conceptual
Framework for Addressing Psychological Process in the Development of a
Terrorist”; Tomas Precht, Home Grown Terrorism and Islamist Radicalization

von hlatky interior.qxp_Layout 1 2019-09-24 10:21 PM Page 43

Terrorists, Radicals, and Activists

43

in Europe (Copenhagen: Danish Ministry of Justice, 2007); Mitchell D. Silber
and Arvin Bhatt, Radicalization in the West: The homegrown threat (New York:
nypd, 2007); Edwin Bakker, “Jihadi Terrorist in Europe and Global Salafi
Jihadist,” in Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalization Challenge in Europe, ed.
Rik Coolsaet. (Aldershot UK: Ashgate, 2008); Lorenzo Vidino, Countering
Radicalization in America: Lessons from Europe, Special Report (Washington
dc: United States Institute of Peace, 2010), http://www.usip.org/ files/resources
/SR262-Countering_Radicalization_in_America.pdf.
16 Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks; Sageman, Leaderless Jihad; Horgan,
The Psychology of Terrorism; John Horgan, Divided We Stand: The Psychology
and Strategy of Ireland’s Dissident Terrorists (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2011); Edwin Bakker, “Jihadi Terrorist in Europe and Global Salafi
Jihadist”; Michael King and Devon M. Taylor, “The Radicalization of HomeGrown Jihadists: A Review of Theoretical Models and Psychological Evidence,”
Terrorism and Political Violence 23, no. 4 (2011): 602–22.
17 Bruce Hoffman, “Terrorism in the West: Al-Qaeda’s Role in Home-Grown
Terror,” Brown Journal of World Affairs 13, no. 2 (2007): 91–9; Bruce Hoffman,
“The Myth of Grass-Roots Terrorism,” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 3 (2008): 133–8.
18 Ibid.
19 Matthew Apuzzo and Adam Goldman, “With cia Help, nypd Moves Covertly
in Muslim Areas,” Associated Press, 23 August 2011, http://www.ap.org/Content/
AP-in-the-News/2011/With-CIA-help-NYPD-moves-covertly-in-Muslim-areas.
20 Eli Berman, Radical, Religious, and Violent: The New Economics of Terrorism
(Cambridge ma: mit Press, 2009).
21 Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, Radicalization in the West; Tomas Precht,
Home Grown Terrorism and Islamist Radicalization in Europe.
22 John Horgan, Walking Away from Terrorism: Accounts of Disengagement from
Radical and Extremist Movements (Abingdon UK: Routledge, 2009); Tore
Bjorgo and John Horgan, eds., Walking Away from Terrorism: Individual and
Collective Disengagement (Abingdon UK: Routledge, 2009); John Horgan and
Max Taylor, “Disengagement, De-radicalization and the Arc of Terrorism:
Future Directions for Research,” in Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalization
Challenge, 2nd ed., ed. Rik Coolsaet (London: Ashgate, 2011).
23 Ibid.
24 Sophia Moskalenko and Clark McCauley, US Muslims with Radical Opinions

von hlatky interior.qxp_Layout 1 2019-09-24 10:21 PM Page 44

Leuprecht, Skillicorn, and McCauley

44

Feel More Alienated and Depressed (Report to the Office of University Programs,
Science and Technology Directorate, US Department of Homeland Security,
College Park, md: start, 2017), http://start.umd.edu/publication/us-muslimsradical-opinions-feel-more-alienated-and-depressed.
25 Eli Berman, “Sect, Subsidy, and Sacrifice: An economist’s view of ultraorthodox Jews,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 65, no. 3 (2000): 905–53; Quan
Li, and Drew Schaub, “Economic Globalization and Transnational Terrorist
Incidents: A Pooled Time-Series Cross-Sectional Analysis,” Journal of Conflict
Resolution 48, no. 2 (2004): 230–58; Daniel L. Chen, “Club Goods and Group
Identity: Evidence From Islamic Resurgence During the Indonesian Financial
Crisis,” Journal of Political Economy 118, no. 2 (2010): 300–54; Brian Burgoon,
“On Welfare and Terrorism: Social Welfare Policies And Political-Economic
Roots Of Terrorism,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, no.2 (2006): 176–203.
26 Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, “Education, Poverty And Terrorism: Is
There A Causal Connection?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 17, no.4 (2004):
119–44.
27 US White House, National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington
dc: Government Printing Office, 2002).
28 Skillicorn, Leuprecht, and Winn, “Home-Grown Islamist Radicalization in
Canada: Process Insights from an Attitudinal Survey.”
29 Clark McCauley et. al., “Tracking the War of Ideas.”
30 Ibid.
31 David Betz, “The Virtual Dimension of Contemporary Insurgency and
Counterinsurgency,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 19, no. 4 (2008): 520.
32 Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, “Understanding Political Radicalization: The Two-Pyramids Model,” American Psychologist 72, no.3 (2017): 205–16.
33 Clark McCauley et al., “Measuring Political Mobilization,” 239–60.
34 McCauley and Moskalenko, “Understanding Political Radicalization.”
35 Clark McCauley, Thomas Quiggin, and Sophia Moskalenko, Momin Khawaja:
Mechanisms of Radicalization (Final Report to the Office of University Programs, Science and Technology Directorate, US Department of Homeland
Security, College Park, md: start, 2016), https://www.start.umd.edu/
pubs/START_CSTAB_2.5_MominKhawajaMechanismsofRadicalization_
Aug2016.pdf.
36 McCauley and Moskalenko, Friction.

von hlatky interior.qxp_Layout 1 2019-09-24 10:21 PM Page 45

Terrorists, Radicals, and Activists

45

37 See for example Sageman, Leaderless Jihad.
38 Nina Glick Schiller et. al., Towards a Transnational Perspective on Migration:
Race, Class, Ethnicity, and Nationalism Reconsidered (New York: New York
Academy of Sciences, 1992); See also P. Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles: War,
Peace, and the Course of History (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 2002).
39 Jamie Bartlett, Jonathan Birdwell, and Michael King, The Edge of Violence
(London: Demos, 2012).
40 Shahid Bux, “Muslim Youths, Islam and Violent Radicalization: Addressing
Some Myths,” The Police Journal 80, (2007): 267–78; Thomas Hegghammer,
“Terrorist Recruitment and Radicalization,” 39–60; John Horgan, “From Profiles To Pathways And Roots To Routes: Perspectives From Psychology On
Radicalization Into Terrorism,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 618, no. 1 (2008): 80–94; Aidan Kirby, “The London
Bombers As Self-Starters: A Case Study In Indigenous Radicalization And The
Emergence Of Autonomous Cliques,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30, no. 5
(2007): 415–28; Evan F. Kohlmann, “Homegrown Terrorists: Theory And Cases
In The War On Terror’s Newest Front,” The Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science 618, no. 1 (2008): 95–109; Clark McCauley and
Sophia Moskalenko, “Measuring Political Mobilization: The Distinction Between Activism And Radicalism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 21, no. 2
(2009): 239–60.
41 See for example: Justin Magouirk et. al., “Connecting Terrorist Networks,”
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31, no. 1 (2008): 1–16; Bent L. Smith et. al., American Terrorism Study: Patterns of Behavior, Investigation and Prosecution of
American Terrorist, Final Report (Washington, dc: Department of Justice,
2002); and Mark S. Hamm, Terrorism as Crime: From Oklahoma City to AlQaeda and Beyond (New York: New York University Press, 2007).
42 Kirby, “The London Bombers As Self-Starters,” 415–28.
43 See Hegghammer, “Terrorist Recruitment and Radicalization,” 39–60. This
may also include charismatic leaders. See for example: S. O’Neill and D.
McGrory, The Suicide Factory, Abu Hamza and the Finsbury Park Mosque
(Harper Perennial: London, 2006).
44 Hegghammer, “Terrorist Recruitment and Radicalization,” 39–60.
45 Evan F. Kohlmann, “Homegrown Terrorists,” 95-109; Anne Stenersen, “The
Internet: A Virtual Training Camp?,” Terrorism and Political Violence 20, no. 2

von hlatky interior.qxp_Layout 1 2019-09-24 10:21 PM Page 46

Leuprecht, Skillicorn, and McCauley

46

(2008): 215–33; Brynjar Lia, “Al Qaeda Online: Understanding Jihadist Internet
Infrastructure,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 18, no. 1 (2006).
46 Donald E. Emerson, Metternich and the Political Police: Security and Subversion
in the Hapsburg Monarchy (1815–1830) (Martinus Nijhoff: The Hague, 1968).
47 Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (London: Houghton Mifflin, 2006).
48 Christian Leuprecht et. al., “Winning the Battle but Losing the War? Narrative
and Counter-Narrative Strategy,” Perspectives on Terrorism 3, no. 2 (2009):
25–35.

